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Survival Remedies for Deaths on the High Seas
Edward J. Balzarini, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)' provides a federal
cause of action for deaths resulting from "[a] wrongful act, neglect,
or default ' 2 which occurs beyond a marine league (three nautical
miles) from the shore of any state, territory or dependency of the
United States.3 The decedent's personal representative is authorized to bring the action in admiralty, in a United States District
Court, on behalf of a defined class of beneficiaries.4 The measure of
damages in a DOHSA action is defined as the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the beneficiaries.5 In Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham,6 the Supreme Court held that nonpecuniary remedies for wrongful death, such as compensation for loss of society,
cannot be recovered in a DOHSA action.
Since the Higginbotham decision, a recurring issue in actions for
maritime death is whether the recovery under DOHSA can be supplemented with a claim for survival damages. A survival claim,
which is brought on behalf of the decedent's estate, typically seeks
damages for a decedent's conscious pain and suffering and lost
earnings.7 This article discusses the question of whether, in the af* B.A., 1978, Denison University; J.D., cum laude, 1981, Dickinson School of Law. The
author is associated with the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania law firm of Balzarini, Carey, &
Maurizi.
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1926).
2. Id. § 761.
3. In addition to deaths occurring on the seas, DOHSA has been applied in actions
arising out of aircraft presumably lost at sea. See, e.g., Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438
F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976), rehearingdenied, 545 F.2d 1298 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
4. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976). The beneficiaries are defined as including the decedent's
wife, husband, parent, child or dependent relative.
5. Id. § 762.
6. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
7. See S. SPEISER, 2D RECOVERY FOR WRONGFuL DEATH §§ 14:6-14:8. Of those jurisdictions which include the decedent's lost earnings as an element of damages in a survival
action, some provide for recovery of the decedent's probable lifetime earnings, while others
include only those earnings lost from the date of injury to the date of death.
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termath of Higginbotham, a claim for survival damages can properly be joined with a DOHSA claim, and considers the possible
sources of a survival remedy for deaths occurring on the high seas.

II. Higginbotham, DOHSA,

AND SURVIVAL REMEDIES

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham is the third of a recent trilogy
of Supreme Court decisions which decided issues involving federal
remedies for tortious maritime death. The first of these decisions,
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,s created a federal nonstatutory remedy under the general maritime law for deaths occurring
within state territorial waters. Moragne thus repudiates the rule of
9 which
The Harrisburg,
in 1886 held that federal maritime law did
not recognize a cause of action for wrongful death. The enactment
in 192010 of DOHSA, which provides a cause of action for wrongful
deaths occurring outside of a state's territorial waters, was a congressional response to the rule of The Harrisburg." DOHSA, however, provides no cause of action for wrongful deaths occurring
within territorial waters, and prior to Moragne the availability of
such an action in cases involving non-seamen was therefore depen2
dent on the existence of a relevant state wrongful death statute.1
While Moragne judicially created a federal cause of action for
certain maritime wrongful deaths, it left for later decision the determination of the elements of damage recoverable in a Moragne
death action. Shortly thereafter, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet,'s the Court defined the Moragne remedy as including recovery of damages for loss of the decedent's support, services and
society, but not for the survivors' mental anguish or grief.14 The
Court based its inclusion of loss of society"5 as an element of dam8. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
9. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
10. Also enacted in 1920 was the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), which includes a
remedy for the wrongful death of a seaman in the course of employment as the result of the
employer's negligence. Its applicability is not limited to the high seas, and it includes a
survival remedy.
11. See 59 CONG. REc. 4482 (1920) (56th Congress, remarks of Rep. Volstead).
12. Prior to Moragne federal courts routinely permitted recovery under a state wrongful death statute for deaths occurring within the state's territorial waters. See, e.g., Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
13. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
14. Id. at 586 n.17. The Court noted that "the great majority of jurisdictions" do not
provide for recovery of damages for the metal anguish or grief of the survivors of the decedent in a wrongful death action.
15. The Court defined the term "society" as embracing "a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the others' continued existence, including love, af-
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ages on the fact that a majority of state wrongful-death statutes
permit such a recovery, and its recognition of "the humanitarian
policy of the maritime law to show special solicitude for those who
are injured within its jurisdiction."1 6
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, the Court was presented
with the question of whether in an action for wrongful death occurring on the high seas, recovery under DOHSA could be supplemented by recovery of the non-pecuniary damages for "loss of society" available under the Moragne remedy. Higginbotham arose out
of a helicopter crash which occurred in the Gulf of Mexico outside
of Louisiana's territorial waters. The trial court awarded damages
under DOHSA for the beneficiaries' pecuniary loss, but refused to
award compensation for loss of society on grounds that DOHSA
does not provide for such a recovery.1 8 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed,"' holding that a claim under the general
maritime wrongful death law created in Moragne could be brought
along with a DOHSA action, and the beneficiaries could thereby
recover non-pecuniary damages for "loss of society" in addition to
compensation for their pecuniary losses.
Although its decision resulted in a disparity in the damages recoverable for deaths occurring in territorial waters and on the high
seas, the Supreme Court reversed 2" the court of appeals' decision
in Higginbotham.The Court held that there can be no recovery for
non-pecuniary damages for a death which occurs on the high seas
because DOHSA expressly limits the amount of the recovery to the
beneficiaries' pecuniary loss. The opinion states that a desire for
uniformity in the measure of damages for maritime wrongful
deaths must yield to the express language of the statute.2 ' The argument that admiralty courts have traditionally supplemented
maritime statutes was rejected as follows:
We realize that, because Congress has never enacted a comprehensive
maritime code, admiralty courts have often been called upon to supplement
maritime statutes. The Death on the High Seas Act, however, announces

fection, care, attention, companionship, comfort and protection." Id. at 586.
16. Id. at 589.
17. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
18. See id. at 619.
19. 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977).
20. 436 U.S. 618, 626.
21. Id. at 625. The Court also stated that other than in the measure of damages, disparities between DOHSA and the Moragne remedy were not likely to develop. This suggests
that DOHSA's statute of limitations and schedule of beneficiaries are to be applied to the
Moragne remedy. Id. at n.19.
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Congress' considered judgment on such issues as the beneficiaries, the limitations period, contributory negligence, survival, and damages . .

.

. The

Act does not address every issue of the wrongful-death law,. . . but when it
does speak directly to a question, the courts are not free to "supplement"
Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless ...
Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary
losses in order to encourage the creation of nonpecuniary supplements
... .There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and
2 rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically
enacted.

2

The Court's inclusion of "survival" as an issue of maritime death
law governed by DOHSA called into question the widespread practice of supplementing the recovery under DOHSA with survival
damages. Prior to Higginbotham, there were numerous federal decisions holding that DOHSA is a wrongful death statute which
does not preclude a separate survival claim for a decedent's pain
and suffering and lost earnings.2 3 These decisions fall into two categories. The first permits a claim under the survival statute of the
state of the decedent's residence to be joined with a DOHSA action.2 4 The second group of decisions interpret Moragne as creating a federal maritime survival remedy, in addition to a wrongful
death remedy, and permit this survival remedy to supplement the
recovery under DOHSA 2
Chute v.United States26 is the first post-Higginbotham decision
in which the practice of joining a survival claim with a DOHSA
action was challenged. Chute involved the deaths of two passengers on a pleasure yacht which sank just outside of Massachusetts'
territorial waters. The defendant contended that the Supreme
Court had held in Higginbotham that DOHSA is the exclusive
22. Id. at 625 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
23. See cases cited in notes 24 & 25, infra.
24. Canillas v. Joseph H. Carter, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Petition of
Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. The S/S Washington, 172
F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub. noma.
United States v. Texas Co., 272 F.2d 711 (4th Cir.
1959); Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (1964); Dennis v.
Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948
(1972); Egan v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 710 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Dugas v.
National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386 (3d Cir. 1971); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th
Cir. 1976), rehearing denied, 545 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977).
25. Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assoc., Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972); Greene
v. Vantage Steamship Corp., 466 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1972); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d
794 (1st Cir. 1974); Muirhead v. Pacific Inland Navigation, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 361 (W.D.
Wash. 1974); Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975).
26. 466 F. Supp. 61 (D. Mass. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 610 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.
1979).
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remedy for deaths occurring on the high seas, and the plaintiffs
could not therefore recover damages for the decedent's pain and
suffering. The court, however, rejected this expansive interpretation and held that Higginbotham "does not preclude the judicial
recognition of a federal survival action for antemortum pain and
suffering. '27 It predicated its decision on Justice Stevens' observation in Higginbotham that "[tihere is a basic difference between
filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted."2' 8 The court reasoned that since DOHSA is a wrongful death and not a survival
statute, there is a legislative void in the available remedies for
maritime deaths which the courts may fill by recognizing a federal
survival action for deaths on the high seas.
A similar result was reached in Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot" Cruises, Ltd.29 As in Chute, the defendant argued that the
effect of the Supreme Court's holding in Higginbotham was to discredit the practice of supplementing a recovery under DOHSA
with survival damages. Here again, however, the court distinguished a wrongful death action from a survival action, and held
that DOHSA is a wrongful death statute which does not preclude
the separate and distinct remedy available in a survival claim.3 0
After a review of the legislative history of DOHSA, the court concluded that "it is clear that Congress understood the distinction
between the two types of actions,"3 1 and was concerned only with
enacting a wrongful death statute.3 2 The court noted that judicial
recognition of the right to seek survival damages for deaths on the
high seas would serve not only to fill the gap left by Congress, but
also to promote the policy expressed in Moragne that, "certainly, it
better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in
admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy when not required
to withhold it by established and inflexible rules."' 3
The question of whether Higginbotham precludes the recovery
27. 466 F. Supp. at 69.
28. Id. (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
29. 573 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1983), ali'd, 738 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 188 (1984).
30. 573 F. Supp. at 1285.
31. Id.
32. The Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that DOHSA is a wrongful death
statute which does not include a survival remedy. See Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,
414 U.S. 573, 575 n.2 (1974).
33. 573 F. Supp. at 1286 (quoting The Sea Gull, 2 Fed. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578) (C.C.
Md. 1865)).
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of survival damages for deaths on the high sea was considered by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Azzopardi v. Ocean
Drilling and Exploration Co. 34 The court concluded that Higginbotham, like DOHSA, was concerned only with wrongful death
remedies and did not address the issue of survival damages for
maritime deaths. As in Chute and Kuntz, the court in Azzopardi
rejected arguments for an expansive application of Higginbotham
and held that the decision does not preclude a claim for survival
damages in cases involving a death on the high seas. Thus, each of
the courts which to date have considered the issue have declined to
interpret Higginbotham as holding that DOHSA is the exclusive
remedy for deaths occurring within its domain.
Once it is determined that there exists a right to assert a survival claim for a death on the high seas, a question arises as to the
appropriate source of the remedy. Prior to Moragne, the survival
statute of a decedent's state of residence was commonly applied in
conjunction with DOHSA 3 5 In the aftermath of Moragne there has
been a definite trend towards recognition of a non-statutory survival action under the general maritime law." Indeed, all of the
post-Higginbotham decisions discussed above hold that there now
exists a federal maritime survival action which may be joined with
a DOHSA claim.3 7 While recognition of a federal survival action
guarantees a uniformity which is not possible if the varying state
survival statutes are the source of the remedy, it also raises many
issues as to the nature and extent of the damages recoverable in
the action.3 8 Given the maritime law's tradition of showing special
solicitude for those who are injured or die within its jurisdiction,
these issues should be resolved in favor of the victims and their
survivors.
III.

CONCLUSION

A majority of federal courts now recognize a survival remedy
under general maritime law. Since DOHSA is a wrongful death
statute it does not preclude recovery of survival damages for a
34. 742 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1984).
35. See cases cited supra note 24.
36. See cases cited supra note 25.
37. See Chute, 466 F. Supp. 61; Kuntz, 573 F. Supp. 1277; Azzopardi, 742 F.2d 890.
38. For example, is the economic loss to the decedent's estate an item of damages in
the action, and if so, how is the loss to be calculated? See Muirhead v. Pacific Inland Navigation, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 361, 363 (W.D. Wash. 1974); Kuntz v. Windjammer "Barefoot"
Cruises, Ltd., 573 F. Supp. 1277, 1286 (1983).
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death on the high seas. Higginbotham has not been interpreted as
discrediting the practice of supplementing a DOHSA recovery with
survival damages. Definition of the damages recoverable in a federal maritime survival action awaits future decision.

